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Abstract
We study economic incentives for inﬂuencing selﬁsh behavior in networks. We consider a model of selﬁsh routing
in which the latency experienced by network trafﬁc on an edge of the network is a function of the edge congestion,
and network users are assumed to selﬁshly route trafﬁc on minimum-latency paths. The quality of a routing of trafﬁc
is historically measured by the sum of all travel times, also called the total latency.
It is well known that the outcome of selﬁsh routing (a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium) does not minimize the to-
tal latency, and that marginal cost pricing—charging each network user for the congestion effects caused by its
presence—eliminates the inefﬁciency of selﬁsh routing. However, the principle of marginal cost pricing assumes
that taxes cause no disutility to network users; this is appropriate only when collected taxes can be feasibly returned
(directly or indirectly) to the users. If this assumption does not hold and we wish to minimize the total user disutility
(latency plus taxes paid)—the total cost—how should we price the network edges? Intuition may suggest that taxes
can never improve the cost of a Nash equilibrium, but the famous Braess’s Paradox shows this intuition to be
incorrect.
We consider strategies for pricing network edges to reduce the cost of a Nash equilibrium. Since levying a
sufﬁciently large tax on an edge effectively removes it from the network, our study generalizes previous work on
designing networks for selﬁsh users [T. Roughgarden, Designing networks for selﬁsh users is hard, in: Proceedings
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of the 42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2001, pp. 472–481 (full version to
appear in Journal of Computer and System Sciences)]. In this paper, we prove the following results.
• In a large class of networks—including all networks with linear latency functions—marginal cost taxes do not
improve the cost of a Nash equilibrium.
• The largest-possible beneﬁt from taxes does not exceed that from edge removals. In every network with linear
latency functions, the beneﬁt of taxes cannot exceed that of removing edges. There are networks with nonlinear
latency functions, however, in which taxes are radically more powerful than edge removals.
• For every > 0, there is no ( 43 − )-approximation algorithm for computing optimal taxes, even in networks with
linear latency functions (assuming P = NP ).
© 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Selﬁsh routing and marginal cost pricing
We study economic incentives for inﬂuencing selﬁsh behavior in networks. We focus on a simple
model of selﬁsh routing, deﬁned by Wardrop [44] and ﬁrst studied in the theoretical computer science
literature by Roughgarden and Tardos [39]. In this model, we are given a directed network in which
each edge possesses a latency function describing the common delay experienced by all trafﬁc on the
edge as a function of the edge congestion. There is a ﬁxed amount of trafﬁc that wishes to travel from a
source vertex s to a sink vertex t; as in most earlier works, we assume that the trafﬁc comprises a very
large population of users, so that the actions of a single individual have negligible impact on the network
congestion. The quality of an assignment of trafﬁc to s–t paths is historically measured by the resulting
sum of all travel times—the total latency. We assume that each network user, when left to its own devices,
acts selﬁshly and routes itself on a minimum-latency path, given the network congestion caused by the
other users. In general such a “selﬁsh” assignment of trafﬁc to paths (a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium) does not
minimize the total latency; put differently, the outcome of selﬁsh behavior can be improved upon with
coordination.
The inefﬁciency of selﬁsh routing motivates the introduction of economic incentives to ensure that
selﬁsh behavior results in a socially desirable routing of trafﬁc. An ancient idea—discussed informally
as early as 1920 [35]—is to use marginal cost pricing. The principle of marginal cost pricing asserts that
on each edge, each network user on the edge should pay a tax equal to the additional delay its presence
causes for the other users on the edge. Assuming that all network users choose routes to minimize the
sum of the latency experienced and the taxes paid, this principle ensures that the resulting ﬂow at Nash
equilibrium achieves the minimum-possible total latency [5]. Brieﬂy, the inefﬁciency of selﬁsh routing
can always be eradicated by pricing network edges appropriately.
The following observation motivates our work: the principle of marginal cost pricing is single-minded
in its pursuit of a minimum-latency ﬂow, and ignores the disutility to network users due to (possi-
bly very large) taxes. This assumption is only appropriate when collected taxes can be feasibly re-
turned (directly or indirectly) to the network users, for example by refunding taxes equally to all users
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Fig. 1. Braess’s Paradox.
(a “lump-sum refund”). In this paper, we are interested in settings where this assumption is not reason-
able. For example, refunding the collected taxes to network users could be logistically or economically
infeasible, or taxes could represent quantities of a non-monetary, non-refundable good such as time
delays.
If we wish to minimize the total user disutility—latency plus taxes paid, a quantity we call the cost—
rather than merely the total latency, how should we price the network edges?
1.2. Braess’s Paradox and the power of taxes
Intuition may suggest that taxes, which can only increase the disutility incurred by users along an s–t
path, can never improve the cost of a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium. We next describe Braess’s Paradox [7],
in a form ﬁrst described by Schulman [40], which shows that this intuition is incorrect.
Each edge of the network in Fig. 1 is labeled with its latency function, giving the delay incurred by
trafﬁc on the link as a function of the amount of trafﬁc that uses the link. (We assume that there is one unit
of trafﬁc overall.) In the (unique) ﬂow at Nash equilibrium, all trafﬁc uses route the s → v → w → t
and experiences two units of latency. On the other hand, if at least half a unit of tax is levied on the edge
(v,w), then in the ﬂow at Nash equilibrium half of the trafﬁc uses each of the routes s → v → t and
s → w → t . In particular, the path s → v → w → t has latency 1 and cost at least 3/2 with respect to
this ﬂow, and hence does not offer an attractive alternative to trafﬁc. In this new ﬂow at Nash equilibrium,
everyone experiences latency 3/2 and no taxes are paid. This outcome has cost 3/2 and is clearly superior
to the original ﬂow at Nash equilibrium in the absence of taxes.
For contrast, we next discuss the edge taxes that are dictated by the principle of marginal cost pricing
for the network of Fig. 1. As we will see in Section 3.1, these taxes are 1/2 on the edges (s, v) and (w, t)
and 0 on the other three edges. With these taxes, we obtain the same ﬂow at Nash equilibrium as in our
previous solution with taxes, and all trafﬁc experiences latency 3/2. However, all trafﬁc must also pay
1/2 unit of tax. This solution thus has a cost of 2; evidently, the previous solution should be preferred
over marginal cost taxes in this example.
The potential power of taxes to improve the cost of a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium, together with the
inadequacy of marginal cost pricing for this goal, motivate the questions that we study in this paper.
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Table 1
Contributions of this paper
Section Problem studied Linear Arbitrary
3 Do marginal cost taxes ever help? No Yes
4 Maximum beneﬁt of taxes 4/3 n/2
5 Are taxes more powerful than edge removals? No Yes
6 Approximability of optimal taxes 4/3 [4/3, n/2]
All results depend on the set of allowable edge latency functions. For simplicity, we list only results for networks with linear
or arbitrary latency functions. The beneﬁt of taxes is measured by the ratio in Nash ﬂow cost before and after taxes are levied.
(1) Are marginal cost taxes ever a good idea for minimizing the cost of a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium?
(2) A sufﬁciently large edge tax effectively removes the edge from the network, and the power of removing
edges to improve a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium is well understood [36]. Taxes are thus at least as powerful
as edge removals; when are they strictly more powerful?
(3) Can we compute or approximate optimal taxes efﬁciently?
1.3. Our results
Our contributions on these three questions are proofs of the following results.
• In every network with linear latency functions, marginal cost taxes do not improve the cost of a ﬂow at
Nash equilibrium.
• The maximum-possible beneﬁt of taxes is no more than that of edge removals.
• For every network with linear latency functions—not merely worst-case examples—taxes cannot de-
crease the cost of a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium beyond what can be achieved by removing edges. By
contrast, there are networks with nonlinear latency functions in which taxes can radically improve over
the best subgraph solution.
• For every  > 0, there is no (43 − )-approximation algorithm for computing optimal taxes, even in
networks with linear latency functions (assumingP = NP ). For networks with linear latency functions,
this hardness result is optimal.
Table 1 summarizes our results. Determining the maximum-possible beneﬁt of taxes and the (in) approx-
imability of the problem of computing optimal taxes require only reasonably straightforward extensions
of existing work on network design [36]; all other results of this paper require new constructions and
proof approaches.
1.4. Related work
As we have noted, marginal cost pricing in selﬁsh routing networks was ﬁrst proposed by Pigou [35].
The model of selﬁsh routing studied in this paper was ﬁrst mathematically formalized in the 1950s by
Wardrop [44] and Beckmann et al. [5], and has been extensively studied ever since. Further discussion
and many more references on both selﬁsh routing and related network models can be found in [38].
We make no attempt to survey the vast literature on the optimal pricing of shared resources, and mention
only a few references that can serve as a starting point for further reading. Surveys and recent work on
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pricing selﬁsh routing networks by the transportation science community include [4,6,13,14,16,22,23,41].
There have also been several recent theoretical computer science papers on the topic [9,17,18,24]. While
researchers have long realized that marginal cost taxes may cause users to pay more than is necessary
(see e.g. [6,22]), none of the above papers incorporated the taxes paid into the deﬁnition of social wel-
fare as in the present work. Beyond selﬁsh routing networks, there has been an enormous amount of
research on pricing in various network models; see [1,8,20,26,30,31] and the references therein for many
examples.
We note that much of the aforementioned work can be interpreted in the context of general microeco-
nomic theory; see the survey by Mirrlees [33], for example, for discussion and references on this point.
We are not, however, aware of any work in the economics literature that directly applies to the questions
posed in this paper.
Some of the issues that we study are similar in spirit to the work on “frugal mechanisms” pioneered
by Archer and Tardos [2,3] and studied further in [15,25,32,42]. These papers seek mechanisms (such as
auctions) that solve an optimization problem in an incentive-compatible way, but also make use of only
moderate incentives.
The paper closest to the present work is that of Roughgarden [36] on designing networks for selﬁsh
users. The central questions of [36] concern the maximum-possible beneﬁt from and the algorithmic
complexity of removing edges from a network with selﬁsh routing. These questions can be viewed as
special cases of some of the problems considered here, with edge taxes restricted to be either 0 or +∞.
This paper extends some of the results of [36] to the setting of more general taxes, and in addition tackles
problems that have not been previously considered.
1.5. Organization
In Section 2 we formally deﬁne our trafﬁc routing model and review useful results from past works.
In Section 3 we ask if marginal cost pricing can improve the cost of selﬁsh routing, and we resolve
this question in the negative for networks with linear latency functions. In Sections 4 and 5 we ask if
the power of taxes exceeds that of edge removals. In Section 4 we adapt previous work on network
design [36] to show that the largest-possible decrease in cost due to taxes cannot exceed that due to edge
removals. In Section 5 we show that taxes never improve over the best solution achievable by removing
edges in networks with linear latency functions, but can be radically more powerful than edge removals
in networks with arbitrary latency functions. Section 6 studies the algorithmic problem of computing
taxes to minimize the cost of a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium. Section 7 concludes with several suggestions
for future research.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Networks and ﬂows
We follow the notation and conventions of Roughgarden and Tardos [39]. We study a single-commodity
ﬂow network, described by a directed graph G = (V ,E) with a source vertex s and a sink vertex t. We
allow parallel edges but have no use for self-loops. We denote the set of simple s–t paths by P , and we
assume that this set is non-empty. A ﬂow f is a non-negative vector, indexed by P . For a ﬁxed ﬂow f we
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deﬁne fe = ∑P∈P:e∈P fP as the amount of trafﬁc using edge e en route from s to t. With respect to a
ﬁnite and positive trafﬁc rate r, a ﬂow f is said to be feasible if ∑P∈P fP = r .
The network G suffers from congestion effects; to model this, we assume that each edge e possesses a
non-negative, continuous, non-decreasing latency function e that describes the delay incurred by trafﬁc
on e as a function of the edge congestion fe. The latency of a path P in G with respect to a ﬂow f is then
given by P (f ) = ∑e∈P e(fe). The quality of a ﬂow is historically measured by its total latency L(f ),
deﬁned by
L(f ) ≡
∑
P∈P
P (f )fP =
∑
e∈E
e(fe)fe,
where the equality follows by writing P (f ) as a sum over edges and reversing the order of summation.
We will call a ﬂow minimizing L(·) optimal or minimum-latency. An optimal ﬂow always exists, as the
space of all ﬂows is compact and L(·) is a continuous function.
Finally, we allow a set of non-negative taxes {e}e∈E to be placed on the edges of a network G. We
write P = ∑e∈P e for the total taxes on a path P. The cost C(f, ) of a ﬂow f in a network with taxes 
is the total disutility caused to network users, accounting for disutility due to both latency and taxes:
C(f, ) ≡
∑
P∈P
[P (f ) + P ]fP =
∑
e∈E
[e(fe) + e]fe.
The functions L(·) and C(·, ) coincide if  = 0. 4 We call a triple (G, r, ) an instance, and use the
notation (G, r,  + ) to denote an instance in which taxes  have been levied on the edges of G.
2.2. Flows at Nash equilibrium
We assume that non-cooperative behavior results in a Nash equilibrium—a “stable point” in which no
trafﬁc has an incentive to unilaterally alter its strategy (i.e., its route from s to t). We also assume that
all agents seek to minimize the sum of the latency experienced and the tax paid. 5 We therefore expect
that, in a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium, all trafﬁc is routed on paths with minimum-possible latency plus tax.
Formally, we have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A ﬂow f feasible for (G, r,  + ) is at Nash equilibrium or is a Nash ﬂow if for all
P1, P2 ∈ P with fP1 > 0,
P1(f ) + P1P2(f ) + P2 .
We next discuss several useful properties of ﬂows at Nash equilibrium in single-commodity net-
works. None of these results are new; for proofs, see the original research papers or the book by
Roughgarden [38].
4 In several previous papers on selﬁsh routing (without taxes), such as [37,39], the terms total latency and cost were used
synonymously.
5 This assumption, while classical, is obviously quite strong. In general, we expect different agents to have different objective
functions and to trade off time and money in different ways. This objection raises several interesting issues that were studied in
a recent sequence of papers [9,17,18,24].
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First is an alternative deﬁnition of a Nash ﬂow, which is a simple consequence of the fact that such a
ﬂow routes trafﬁc only on shortest paths with respect to latencies plus taxes.
Proposition 2.2 (Roughgarden [36]). Let f be a ﬂow feasible for (G, r,  + ). For a vertex v in G, let
d(v) denote the length, with respect to edge lengths e(fe) + e, of a shortest s–v path in G. Then
d(w) − d(v)e(fe) + e
for all edges e = (v,w), and f is at Nash equilibrium if and only if equality holds whenever fe > 0.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 2.2 is that the property of being at Nash equilibrium is a
property only of the ﬂow vector on edges {fe} induced by a ﬂow f, rather than on the particular path
decomposition.
Corollary 2.3. Suppose f, f˜ are ﬂows for (G, r,  + ) with fe = f˜e for all edges e. Then f is at Nash
equilibrium if and only if f˜ is at Nash equilibrium.
We next discuss the existence and uniqueness of Nash ﬂows.
Proposition 2.4 (Beckmann et al. [5] and Dafermos and Sparrow [12]). Every instance (G, r, +) ad-
mits a directed acyclic ﬂow at Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2.5 (Beckmann et al. [5] and Dafermos and Sparrow [12]). If f, f˜ are ﬂows at Nash equi-
librium for (G, r,  + ), then:
(a) e(fe) = e(f˜e) for all edges e;
(b) C(f, ) = C(f˜ , ).
The next proposition states that all paths used by a Nash ﬂow have the same combined latency and
tax, and that the cost of a Nash ﬂow is therefore expressible in a very simple form. It follows easily from
Deﬁnition 2.1 and the deﬁnition of the cost a ﬂow.
Proposition 2.6 (Wardrop [44]). Let f be at Nash equilibrium for the instance (G, r,  + ). Then, there
is a constant c0 such that:
(a) P (f ) + P = c whenever fP > 0;
(b) C(f, ) = r · c.
Propositions 2.5(b) and 2.6(b) imply that the constant c in Proposition 2.6 is independent of the chosen
Nash ﬂow f for (G, r,  + ). We can therefore adopt the notation c(G, r,  + ) for the value of this
constant for the instance (G, r,  + ).
Our ﬁnal proposition states that, for ﬁxed G, , and , the value of c(G, r,  + ) is non-decreasing in
r. This fact was ﬁrst proved by Hall [21] and we will use it in Section 3. For a combinatorial proof of the
proposition, see Lin et al. [28].
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Fig. 2. The second and third Braess graphs. Edges are labeled with their type. (a) B2, (b) B3.
Proposition 2.7 (Hall [21]). The value c(G, r,  + ) is non-decreasing in r.
2.3. The Braess graphs
In this subsection we review the “Braess graphs”. These networks were ﬁrst deﬁned by
Roughgarden [36] to show that removing edges from a network can decrease the total latency of a Nash
ﬂow by an unbounded amount. As levying taxes can be viewed as a natural generalization of removing
edges, these networks will also play an important role in this paper.
The kth Braess graph Bk = (V k, Ek) is deﬁned as follows: start with a set V k = {s, v1, . . . , vk,
w1, . . . , wk, t} of 2k + 2 vertices and deﬁne Ek by {(s, vi), (vi, wi), (wi, t) : 1ik} ∪ {(vi, wi−1) :
2ik} ∪ {(v1, t), (s, wk)} (see Fig. 2). The graph B1 is the same as Braess’s original example (Fig. 1).
To describe latency functions for and ﬂows in Bk in a convenient way, we introduce additional terminol-
ogy. We call edges of the form (vi, wi) type A edges; edges of the form (vi, wi−1), (v1, t), or (s, wk) type
B edges; and edges of the form (s, vi) or (wi, t) type C edges (see Fig. 2). For i = 1, . . . , k, let Pi denote
the path s → vi → wi → t . Finally, for i = 2, . . . , k, let Qi denote the path s → vi → wi−1 → t ;
deﬁne Q1 to be the path s → v1 → t and Qk+1 the path s → wk → t .
Braess graphs show that the latency of a Nash ﬂow in an n-vertex network can be improved by an
n/2	 factor by removing n/2	 − 1 edges from the network.
Proposition 2.8 (Roughgarden [36]). For every n2, removing edges from a network with n vertices
and arbitrary latency functions can decrease the total latency of a Nash ﬂow by a factor of n/2	.
Proof. Fix n, which we can assume is at least 4, and let k = n/2	−1. Deﬁne latency functions k on the
edges of Bk as follows: type A edges have constant latency 0; type B edges have constant latency 1; and
for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, the type C edges (wi, t) and (s, vk−i+1) receive a continuous, non-decreasing
latency function ke satisfying ke(k/(k + 1)) = 0 and ke(1) = i.
Routing one unit of ﬂow on each of the paths P1, . . . , Pk gives a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium for the
instance (Bk, k, k) in which all trafﬁc experiences latency k + 1 (see Fig. 3(a)). Removing the type
A edges from Bk produces a subgraph H, and routing k/(k + 1) units of ﬂow on each of the paths
Q1, . . . ,Qk+1 yields a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium for (H, k, k) with all trafﬁc incurring latency 1 (see
Fig. 3(b)). 
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Fig. 3. Proof of Proposition 2.8, when k = 3. Solid edges carry trafﬁc in the ﬂow at Nash equilibrium, dashed edges do not. Edge
latencies are with respect to ﬂows at Nash equilibrium. (a) Nash ﬂow for (B3, 3, 3), (b) Nash ﬂow in the optimal subgraph.
We will also study networks with edge latency functions that are degree-bounded polynomials with
non-negative coefﬁcients. The following analogue of Proposition 2.8 holds for such networks.
Corollary 2.9 (Roughgarden [36]). Removing edges from a network with latency functions that are poly-
nomials with degree at most p and non-negative coefﬁcients can decrease the total latency of a Nash ﬂow
by an (p/ log p) factor as p → ∞.
Corollary 2.9 can be proved with a modiﬁcation of the construction used in Proposition 2.8, using the
kth Braess graph with k ≈ p/ log p. The trafﬁc rate and latency functions are identical to those in the
proof of Proposition 2.8, except that a type C edge of the form (wi, t) or (s, vk−i+1) receives the latency
function ixp.
Finally, a lower bound on the beneﬁt achievable with edge removals in networks with linear latency
functions follows from the network in Fig. 1.
Corollary 2.10 (Braess [7] and Schulman [40]). Removing edges from a network with linear latency
functions can decrease the total latency of a Nash ﬂow by a factor of 4/3.
3. When do marginal cost taxes help?
In this section, we study the cost of applying the principle of marginal cost pricing. In Section 3.1 we
formalize marginal cost taxes and the classical guarantee that they induce the minimum-latency ﬂow as
a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium. In Section 3.2, however, we show that marginal cost taxes cannot decrease
the cost of a Nash ﬂow in a network with linear latency functions.
3.1. Marginal cost taxes minimize latency
Recall that the principle of marginal cost pricing posits that each user should pay a tax equal to the
additional delay other users experience because of its presence. Mathematically, this principle asserts that
in a ﬂow f feasible for the instance (G, r, ), the tax e assigned to edge e should be e = fe ·′e(fe), where
′e denotes the derivative of e. (Assume for simplicity that the latency functions are differentiable.) The
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term ′e(fe) corresponds to the marginal increase in latency caused by one user on the edge, and the term
fe is the amount of trafﬁc that suffers from this increase. Marginal cost taxes come with the following
guarantee, which is classical (see [5,12,38] for proofs).
Proposition 3.1. Let (G, r, ) be an instance with differentiable latency functions, admitting a minimum-
latency ﬂow f ∗. Let e = f ∗e · ′e(f ∗e ) denote the marginal cost tax for edge e with respect to f ∗. Then
f ∗ is at Nash equilibrium for (G, r,  + ).
In words, marginal cost taxes induce the minimum-latency ﬂow as a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium.
3.2. Marginal cost taxes increase cost
Proposition 3.1 shows how to minimize the total latency of a Nash ﬂow with edge taxes. But how
effective are marginal cost taxes when we also account for the disutility to trafﬁc due to taxes? We have
already seen, in Section 1.2, that marginal cost taxes need not minimize the cost of a ﬂow. Our next
theorem identiﬁes a reasonably large class of networks—networks in which all latency functions are
linear, with the form (x) = ax + b—in which marginal cost taxes are guaranteed to be unnecessary, if
not detrimental. This result illustrates the dangers of marginal cost pricing when minimizing latency is
not the sole goal.
Theorem 3.2. Let f ∗ and f be minimum-latency and Nash ﬂows, respectively, for an instance (G, r, )
with linear latency functions. Let  denote the marginal cost taxes with respect to f ∗. Then,
C(f, 0)C(f ∗, ).
Proof. Let (G, r, ) be an instance with linear latency functions, with e(x) = aex + be for each edge
e (with ae, be0). Let f ∗ and f be minimum-latency and Nash ﬂows, respectively, for (G, r, ). The
principle of marginal cost pricing dictates that e = f ∗e · ′e(f ∗e ) = aef ∗e for each edge e.
Deﬁne the modiﬁed latency function ∗e by ∗e(x) = 2aex + be. The functions  +  and ∗ are not
identically equal, but the identity
∗e(f ∗e ) = 2aef ∗e + be = e(f ∗e ) + e
holds for every edge e. Proposition 3.1 thus guarantees that f ∗ is at Nash equilibrium not only for the
instance (G, r,  + ), but also for the instance (G, r, ∗). Moreover, in the notation of Proposition 2.6,
c(G, r, ∗) = c(G, r,  + ). (1)
We next claim that f/2 is at Nash equilibrium for (G, r/2, ∗) with
c(G, r/2, ∗) = c(G, r, ). (2)
To see why, we note that since e(x) = aex + be and ∗e(x) = 2aex + be, edge and path latencies with
respect to f/2 in (G, r/2, ∗) and with respect to f in (G, r, ) are identical. That f is a Nash ﬂow for
(G, r, ) then implies that f/2 is at Nash equilibrium for (G, r/2, ∗), with c(G, r/2, ∗) = c(G, r, ). 6
6 The essence of this proof ﬁrst appeared in [39].
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Combining (1) and (2) with Proposition 2.7, we obtain
c(G, r, ) = c(G, r/2, ∗)c(G, r, ∗) = c(G, r,  + ).
The theorem now follows immediately from Proposition 2.6. 
Remark 3.3. Theorem 3.2 concerns only networks with linear latency functions, but it can easily be
extended to networks in which, for some ﬁxed p0, every edge e has a latency function of the form
aex
p + be with ae, be0.
Remark 3.4. There are networks with nonlinear latency functions in which marginal cost taxes can
decrease the cost of a Nash ﬂow. For example, it is possible to deﬁne such an example using the network
in Fig. 1. The latency functions employed in this example are non-convex, and are similar to step functions.
The details are somewhat tedious and we omit them. We do not view this example as a positive result for
marginal cost taxes (as the example is contrived), but rather as justiﬁcation for restricting the network
latency functions in Theorem 3.2. We leave open the question of whether the negative result of Theorem
3.2 can be proved under signiﬁcantly weaker assumptions on the latency functions.
4. How powerful are arbitrary taxes?
In this section we study the following question: how much can the cost of a Nash ﬂow decrease after
levying taxes on the edges? As we will see, a precise answer to this question follows easily from previous
work on the power of edge removals [36].
The maximum-possible beneﬁt from taxes will depend crucially on the allowable network latency
functions. This dependence is characteristic of much of the work on selﬁsh routing (see e.g. [38]). Indeed,
we have already seen a glimpse of such a dependence in the previous section, where marginal cost pricing
can decrease the cost of a Nash ﬂow, but not in networks with linear latency functions.
Our ﬁrst two upper bounds on the maximum-possible reduction in cost due to taxes are consequences
of previous work on the price of anarchy [27,34]. The price of anarchy of a set of selﬁsh routing instances
is the largest ratio between the total latency of a Nash ﬂow of an instance and that of a minimum-latency
ﬂow for the instance. The price of anarchy is a function of the set of allowable latency functions, and this
dependence is by now well understood. For example, the following statements are known (see [10,37]
for further examples).
Proposition 4.1 (Roughgarden and Tardos [39]). The price of anarchy in networks with linear latency
functions is 4/3.
Proposition 4.2 (Roughgarden [37]). The price of anarchy in networks with latency functions that are
polynomialswith degree atmost p and non-negative coefﬁcients is asymptotically(p/ log p) asp → ∞.
Upper bounds on the price of anarchy directly translate to upper bounds on the largest decrease
in cost achievable with taxes: at best, taxes replace the Nash ﬂow in the original network with the
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minimum-latency ﬂow, while causing no additional disutility to network users. We therefore have the
following corollaries.
Corollary 4.3. Let (G, r, ) be an instance with linear latency functions and  a tax on edges. Let f and
f  be Nash ﬂows for (G, r, ) and (G, r,  + ), respectively. Then
L(f ) 43 · C(f , ).
Corollary 4.4. There is a constant c1 > 0 such that the following statement holds for allp2. If (G, r, )
is an instance with polynomial latency functions with degree at most p and non-negative coefﬁcients,  is
a tax on edges, and f and f  are Nash ﬂows for (G, r, ) and (G, r,  + ), respectively, then
L(f )c1
p
log p
· C(f , ).
In Section 2.3 we reviewed the Braess graphs, which give lower bounds on how much deleting edges
can decrease the total latency of a Nash ﬂow. As we have noted, sufﬁciently large taxes can simulate edge
deletions, so these lower bounds carry over to the present setting. In particular, Corollary 2.10 implies
that the bound of Corollary 4.3 is the best possible, and Corollary 2.9 demonstrates that Corollary 4.4 is
optimal up to a constant factor.
In networks with arbitrary latency functions, the price of anarchy is unbounded, even in two-node, two-
link networks [39]. While this might suggest that no ﬁnite upper bound on the largest-possible beneﬁt
of taxes is possible in such networks, a bounded price of anarchy is only a sufﬁcient (and not necessary)
condition for such a bound. Indeed, with no assumptions whatsoever on the network latency functions,
we can still obtain an upper bound that is a function of the network size.
Theorem 4.5. Let (G, r, ) be an instance with n vertices and  a tax on edges. Let f and f  be Nash
ﬂows for (G, r, ) and (G, r,  + ), respectively. Then
L(f )
⌊n
2
⌋
· C(f , ).
The proof of Theorem 4.5 is a straightforward extension of an argument from [36, Theorem 4.1], which
proves the weaker statement that deleting edges from a network can reduce the total latency of a Nash
ﬂow by at most an n/2	 factor. We give the proof in Appendix A for completeness. Proposition 2.8
implies that the bound of Theorem 4.5 is the best possible.
5. Are taxes more powerful than edge removals?
In Section 4, we saw that there is a strong connection between the power of taxes and the power of
edge removals. Speciﬁcally, we found that for several natural classes of networks, the maximum-possible
reduction in cost achievable by levying taxes on edges is the same as that by removing edges from the
network. However, we have not resolved whether or not there exist any networks in which taxes can
improve upon the best solution obtainable by removing edges. In other words, is the power of taxes no
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greater than that of edge removals even on an instance-by-instance basis? We study this question in this
section.
In Section 5.1 we show that the answer is “yes” in networks with linear latency functions: in every
such network, taxes cannot decrease the cost of a Nash ﬂow more than edge removals can. By contrast, in
Section 5.2 we show that in general networks, taxes can reduce the cost of a Nash ﬂow far beyond what
is achievable by merely deleting edges from the network.
5.1. The power of edge removals in networks with linear latency functions
5.1.1. Overview
In this subsection we consider only networks with linear latency functions. Our main result is that taxes
are never more powerful than edge removals in these networks. To state this formally, we will say that
a set  of taxes for the instance (G, r, ) is 0/∞ if, for some Nash ﬂow f  for (G, r,  + ), e = 0 or
f e = 0 for each edge e. We note that 0/∞ taxes are no more powerful than edge removals, since if  is
0/∞ then c(G, r, + ) = c(H, r, ), where H is the subgraph of G comprising the edges with zero tax.
We abuse notation and, with respect to an instance (G, r, ), write C() to denote C(f , ), where f  is
at Nash equilibrium for (G, r, +). The function C() is well deﬁned by Proposition 2.5(b). A tax vector
∗ is optimal for an instance (G, r, ) if C(∗)C() for all non-negative tax vectors . Because there are
an inﬁnite number of possible tax vectors, it is not even obvious that every instance admits an optimal set
of taxes. The following result establishes the stronger statement that every instance (with linear latency
functions) admits an optimal tax vector that is 0/∞.
Theorem 5.1. An instance with linear latency functions admits an optimal set of taxes that is 0/∞.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is fairly involved. To avoid considering an arbitrary network with linear
latency functions, we will argue by contradiction and study a minimal counterexample. As we will see,
minimal counterexamples possess several convenient properties that facilitate the proof.
Precisely, a counterexample is an instance (G, r, ) with linear latency functions that admits no optimal
0/∞ tax. A counterexample is minimal if no other counterexample has fewer edges. A tax  is good for
(G, r, ) if C() < C(ˆ) for all 0/∞ taxes ˆ. If (G, r, ) admits a good tax, then it is clearly a counterex-
ample. We are not yet claiming that a counterexample (G, r, ) admits an optimal tax; conceivably, the
value inf{C() : 0} is not attained by any tax. However, since the set {C() :  is 0/∞} is ﬁnite, every
counterexample admits a good tax.
To achieve the desired contradiction, we will also need a tax that is in some sense minimal. Formally,
we will call a tax minimal for an instance if it is an optimal tax and minimizes
∑
e∈E e among all optimal
taxes . Once we establish that minimal taxes exist for minimal counterexamples, the proof of Theorem
5.1 will be relatively short. Our key lemma is thus the following.
Lemma 5.2. A minimal counterexample admits a minimal tax.
5.1.2. Properties of minimal counterexamples
The proof of Lemma 5.2 makes use of several properties of minimal counterexamples. We establish
these next.
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First, minimal counterexamples are directed acyclic networks, with every good tax inducing a ﬂow at
Nash equilibrium that routes ﬂow on every edge.
Lemma 5.3. Let (G, r, ) be a minimal counterexample,  a good tax, and f  a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium
for (G, r,  + ). Then f e > 0 for all edges e of G.
Proof. If f e = 0 for some edge e of G, then deleting e from G yields a counterexample with fewer
edges. 
Corollary 5.4. If (G, r, ) is a minimal counterexample, then G is directed acyclic.
Proof. The corollary follows immediately from Proposition 2.4 and Lemma 5.3. 
Our next lemma states that Nash ﬂows in minimal counterexamples are unique, up to the path decom-
position of the induced ﬂow on edges (cf., Corollary 2.3).
Lemma 5.5. If (G, r, ) is a minimal counterexample,  is a tax, and f  is a Nash ﬂow for (G, r,  + ),
then f is a Nash ﬂow for (G, r,  + ) if and only if fe = f e for all edges e.
Proof. The “if” direction is Corollary 2.3. For the “only if” direction, suppose for contradiction that f is
a Nash ﬂow for (G, r,  + ) with fe = f e for some edge e. Put ze = fe − f e for each edge e. Since f
and f  are ﬂows at the same trafﬁc rate, z is a (signed) circulation: for each vertex v, with edges +(v)
having tail v and edges −(v) having head v,
∑
e∈+(v)
ze =
∑
e∈−(v)
ze.
By Proposition 2.5(a), ze is non-zero only when e has a constant latency function.
Since (G, r, ) is a counterexample, it admits a good tax ˆ. (Recall  need not be good.) Let f ˆ be a Nash
ﬂow for (G, r, + ˆ). Since f ˆe > 0 for all edges e by Lemma 5.3, {f ˆe + ze}e∈E is a non-negative vector
for  sufﬁciently near zero (positive or negative). In this case, it corresponds (after a path decomposition)
to a ﬂow f  feasible for (G, r,  + ˆ). Moreover, since ze is non-zero only when e possesses a constant
latency function, Proposition 2.2 implies that f  is at Nash equilibrium for (G, r, + ˆ). Since we assumed
that some ze is non-zero, some choice of  yields a Nash ﬂow f  for (G, r,  + ˆ) with f e = 0 for some
edge e. This contradicts Lemma 5.3. 
Finally, we strengthen Proposition 2.6(a) for minimal counterexamples.
Lemma 5.6. Let (G, r, ) be aminimal counterexample,  a good tax, and f  aNash ﬂow for (G, r, +).
Then there is a constant c such that
P (f
) + P = c
for every s–t path P of G.
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Proof. By Lemma 5.3, we can choose a path decomposition f of {f e }e∈E with fP > 0 for all paths
P ∈ P . Corollary 2.3 implies that f is at Nash equilibrium for (G, r,  + ); Proposition 2.6(a) implies
that all s–t paths have a common latency plus tax. 
5.1.3. Proof of Lemma 5.2
Recall that our key lemma, Lemma 5.2, asserts that a minimal counterexample admits a minimal tax.
Our proof of this result requires two technical lemmas, which will allow us to prove the existence of
optimal and minimal taxes for minimal counterexamples via compactness arguments. The ﬁrst lemma
states that bounded taxes sufﬁce to minimize the cost of a Nash ﬂow in a minimal counterexample.
Lemma 5.7. Let (G, r, ) be a minimal counterexample and  a good tax. Let G have n vertices and
deﬁne max = maxe∈E e(r). There is a tax ˜ with maxe ˜enmax and
C(˜)C().
Proof. Let  be a good tax for (G, r, ), with f  at Nash equilibrium for (G, r, + ). We next show how
to decrease taxes while leaving f  at Nash equilibrium.
By Corollary 5.4, G is directed acyclic and we can therefore order the vertices of G so that all edges of
G travel forward. Since f e > 0 on all edges of G (Lemma 5.3), s is the ﬁrst vertex in the ordering and t
is the last. Beginning with the penultimate vertex and proceeding backward in the ordering, we perform
the following operation for each vertex v = s: let v0 denote the minimum tax on an edge with tail v,
subtract v from the tax of every edge with tail v and add v to the tax of every edge with head v. This
operation leaves the total tax of all s–t paths and the cost of all feasible ﬂows unchanged. In particular,
the ﬂow f  remains at Nash equilibrium. When the source s is reached, subtract s from the tax on all
edges with tail s; f  remains at Nash equilibrium and its cost can only decrease. Call the new set of taxes
˜. We have already argued that C(˜)C(); it remains to show that maxe ˜enmax.
We ﬁrst observe that the tax-reducing operations iteratively enforce the following property: every vertex
other than t has an outgoing edge with zero ˜-tax. This property implies that some s–t path, say P0, has
zero ˜-tax. Since C(˜)C(), ˜ is a good tax. Since f  is at Nash equilibrium for (G, r,  + ˜), Lemma
5.6 implies that
P (f
) + ˜P = P0(f )
for every path P ∈ P . Since P0(f )nmax and every edge of G lies on some s–t path (by Lemma 5.3),
no edge tax in ˜ can exceed nmax. The proof is complete. 
The second technical lemma asserts continuity of the map  → C().
Lemma 5.8. Let (G, r, ) be a minimal counterexample. Then the corresponding map  → C() is
continuous.
Proof. Lemma 5.5 ensures that the map  → {f e }e∈E is well deﬁned. Lemma 5.5 and a result of Dafermos
and Nagurney [11, Theorem 3.1] imply that this map is continuous. The lemma then follows easily. 
We are ﬁnally prepared to prove Lemma 5.2.
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Proof of Lemma 5.2. We ﬁrst show that a minimal counterexample (G, r, ) admits an optimal tax—
that inf0 C() is attained by some tax. Let B denote the taxes with all components bounded by nmax,
where n is the number of vertices of G and max = maxe∈E e(r). Since (G, r, ) is a counterexample,
the value inf0 C() is approached by good taxes. Since (G, r, ) is minimal, Lemma 5.7 implies that
inf0 C() is approached by good taxes in B:
inf
∈B C() = inf0 C().
Since B is a compact subset of RE and C is continuous by Lemma 5.8, these inﬁma are attained by some
tax (in B).
Let O denote the (non-empty) set of optimal taxes for (G, r, ). We will show that inf∈O
∑
e e is
attained by some optimal tax. By Lemma 5.7, there is an optimal tax  ∈ O with ∑e∈E emnmax,
where m is the number of edges of G. Since O is the inverse image of a closed set under a continuous map
(write O = C−1(C()) for some  ∈ O), it is a closed subset of RE . Restricting O to taxes with sum of
all components at most mnmax, we obtain a non-empty compact subset S ⊆ O of optimal taxes. Since
 → ∑e e is a continuous function, it attains a minimum on S; this is also its minimum on O, and the
proof is complete. 
5.1.4. Proof of Theorem 5.1
With Lemma 5.2 in hand, we can now prove Theorem 5.1 by a perturbation argument.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. To derive a contradiction, let (G, r, ) be a minimal counterexample,  a minimal
(and hence good) tax, and f  a Nash ﬂow for (G, r, +). Since (G, r, ) is a counterexample,∑e e > 0.
By Lemma 5.6, there is a constant c such that P (f ) + P = c for all s–t paths P of G.
Write e(x) = aex + be for each edge e of G. The equations∑
e∈P
[aefe + be + e] = c
for all P ∈ P , together with the standard ﬂow conservation constraints for f, form a system of equations
linear in them+1 variables {fe}e∈E and c (wherem is the number of edges ofG). By Lemma 5.5, ({f e }, c)
is the unique solution to this system, with ﬂow non-negativity constraints automatically satisﬁed (indeed,
strictly by Lemma 5.3). Choosing m + 1 linearly independent constraints with at least one constraint
corresponding to a path with non-zero tax, there is a square linear system
A
[
f
c
]
= d
for which ({f e }, c) is the unique solution, namely A−1d.
Let e˜ > 0 be a positive edge tax appearing in this linear system (as part of the right-hand side d).
Consider perturbing this tax by subtracting a small number  > 0. This translates to a perturbation of
adding  to the right-hand side of all constraints corresponding to paths that include the edge e˜, resulting
in the new right-hand side d˜. Since f e > 0 for every edge e, the new Nash ﬂow is given by
({f˜e}, c˜) = A−1d˜
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for sufﬁciently small perturbations. Since  is an optimal tax minimizing
∑
e e, subtracting  > 0 from
e˜ produces a non-optimal tax. By Proposition 2.6, it follows that c < c˜. By linearity, however, the
opposite perturbation of adding  to e˜ has the opposite effect, producing a tax ¯ that induces a solution
({f¯e}, c¯) with c¯ < c. This contradicts the optimality of , and the proof is complete. 
5.2. The power of taxes in general networks
The previous subsection showed that in every network with linear latency functions, taxes cannot
improve over the best solution attainable by removing edges from the network. We now demonstrate that
this result does not extend to networks with nonlinear latency functions. In fact, for each value of n2,
there is an n-node network in which arbitrary non-negative taxes can improve upon 0/∞ taxes by an
n/2	 factor. With this result, we will have a good understanding of the relationship between taxes and
edge removals in general networks. Brieﬂy, removing edges can improve the cost of a Nash ﬂow by an
n/2	 factor (Proposition 2.8); taxes can improve the cost of a Nash ﬂow by an n/2	 factor beyond what
is achievable by removing edges (Theorem 5.9); but taxes (or edge removals) cannot improve the cost of
a Nash ﬂow by more than an n/2	 factor (Theorem 4.5).
Theorem 5.9. For each integer n2, there is an instance (G, r, ) with c(H, r, )n/2	 for all sub-
graphs H of G but c(G, r,  + ) = 1 for some tax 0.
Proof. The construction is similar to that in an inapproximability result for network design [36, Theorem
4.3]. We can assume that n is even and at least 4. (For n odd, add an isolated vertex or subdivide an
edge.) We will work with the Braess graph Bk for which 2k + 2 = n. (See Section 2.3 for notation and
terminology.)
We deﬁne latency functions k on the graph Bk as follows.
(A) Type A edges receive the latency function k(x) = 0.
(B) Type B edges are given a (continuous, non-decreasing) latency function k satisfying k(x) = 1 for
x1/(k + 1) and k(x) = n/2 for x1/(k + 1) + , where  > 0 is a sufﬁciently small constant.
(C) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the type C edges (wi, t) and (s, vk−i+1) receive a latency function k
satisfying k(x) = 0 for x1 + 1/(k + 1), k(1 + 1/k) = i, and k(x) = n/2 for x1 + 1/k + .
If a type B edge carries at least 1/(k + 1) +  units of ﬂow or a type C edge carries at least 1 + 1/k + 
units of ﬂow, we will say that the edge is oversaturated. A simple but important observation is that if a
Nash ﬂow oversaturates an edge in (H, r, k) for some subgraph H of Bk , then c(H, r, k)n/2.
First, let  be the tax vector equal to 1 on type A edges and 0 elsewhere. The following ﬂow is then at
Nash equilibrium for (Bk, k + 1, k + ): route 1 unit of ﬂow on each of P1, P2, . . . , Pk and 1/(k + 1)
units of ﬂow on each of Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qk+1. Type A edges then each have zero latency and one unit of
tax, type B edges each have zero tax and one unit of latency, and type C edges have zero latency and tax
(see Fig. 4(a)). This Nash ﬂow proves that c(Bk, k + 1, k + ) = 1.
To ﬁnish the proof, we need to show that c(H, k + 1, k)n/2 for every subgraph H of Bk; this
requires a bit of case analysis. If H is all of Bk , then c(H, k + 1, k) = n/2 because routing 1 + 1/k
units of trafﬁc on each of P1, P2, . . . , Pk provides a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium (see Fig. 4(b)). Similarly,
c(H, k + 1, k) = n/2 if H omits only type B edges.
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Fig. 4. Proof of Theorem 5.9 when k = 3. Solid edges carry trafﬁc in the ﬂow at Nash equilibrium, dashed edges do not. Edges
are labeled with their cost (sum of latency and tax), where latencies are with respect to ﬂows at Nash equilibrium. (a) Latencies
plus taxes in a Nash ﬂow for (Bk, k + 1, k + ), (b) Latencies in a Nash ﬂow for (Bk, k + 1, k).
Next, suppose H omits some type C edge and  > 0 is sufﬁciently small. If edge (s, vi) is not in H, then
every ﬂow feasible for (H, k + 1, k) oversaturates some edge incident to s. Thus c(H, k + 1, k)n/2
if H omits a type C edge incident to s. A symmetric argument applies to subgraphs H that omit a type C
edge incident to t.
Finally, suppose H omits some type A edge, say (vi, wi). The vertex vi then has at most one outgoing
edge in H, which must be a type B edge. If this edge is not oversaturated, then the edge (s, vi) carries
at most 1
k+1 +  units of ﬂow; as in the previous paragraph, this implies that some edge incident to s is
oversaturated. In either case, c(H, k + 1, k)n/2 and the proof is complete. 
6. The complexity of computing optimal taxes
In this section, we study the optimization problem of minimizing the cost of a Nash ﬂow by taxing the
network edges, and extend an existing hardness result for network design [36] to this problem.
By an -approximation algorithm for a minimization problem, we mean an algorithm that runs in
polynomial time and returns a solution no more than  times as costly as an optimal solution. We will call
the value  the approximation ratio or performance guarantee of the algorithm.
The maximum-possible beneﬁt achievable with taxes, as determined in Section 4, has immediate
consequences for the performance guarantee of the trivial algorithm—the algorithm that assigns all
edges zero tax. In particular, Corollary 4.3 implies the following.
Corollary 6.1. The trivial algorithm is a 43 -approximation algorithm for the problem of taxing edges to
minimize the cost of a Nash ﬂow in networks with linear latency functions.
Roughgarden [36] gave several inapproximability results for the problem of removing edges from a
network to minimize the total latency of a Nash ﬂow. We next extend one of them to the problem of
computing optimal taxes in networks with linear latency functions.
Theorem 6.2. For every  > 0, there is no (43 − )-approximation algorithm for the problem of taxing
edges to minimize the cost of a Nash ﬂow in networks with linear latency functions (unless P = NP ).
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Corollary 6.1 and Theorem 6.2 imply that, in networks with linear latency functions, no polynomial-
time algorithm has approximation ratio better than that of the trivial algorithm (assuming P = NP ).
The reduction used to prove Theorem 6.2 is identical to one in [36], and is from a disjoint paths problem.
However, the proof of Theorem 6.2 is slightly more involved than that of its analogue in [36], due to the
extra power of taxes beyond that of edge removals. In particular, proving that “no” instances of a disjoint
paths problem give instances in which all possible taxes induce a costly Nash ﬂow is harder than showing
that all possible subgraphs of these instances have costly Nash ﬂows.
For completeness, we prove Theorem 6.2 in Appendix B.
Remark 6.3. For the problem of removing edges from a network to minimize the total latency of a Nash
ﬂow, Roughgarden [36] also gave inapproximability results for networks with different types of nonlinear
latency functions. These showed that the trivial algorithm is an optimal approximation algorithm for the
problem in these classes of networks. We believe that most (if not all) of these hardness results should
carry over to the problem of computing optimal taxes in networks with nonlinear latency functions, but
we have been unable to verify the details.
7. Directions for further research
We have undertaken the ﬁrst study of using edge taxes to minimize the cost—latency plus taxes paid—
of a Nash ﬂow. While we have answered several basic questions, some obvious gaps in our results remain.
We next list three of the more glaring ones.
(Q1) Suppose we consider restricted latency functions that need not be linear, such as convex functions or
degree-bounded polynomials with non-negative coefﬁcients. Can marginal cost taxes improve the
cost of a Nash ﬂow? Can levying taxes decrease the cost of a Nash ﬂow beyond what is achievable
with edge removals?
(Q2) Is the trivial algorithm an optimal approximation algorithm for the problem of computing optimal
taxes in networks with nonlinear latency functions?
(Q3) Which results of this paper remain true in multicommodity ﬂow networks, with multiple sources
and destinations? (See Lin et al. [29] for some very recent work on this question.)
A broader research issue is to study other approaches to simultaneously minimizing both the total
latency and the taxes paid by trafﬁc. For example, Hearn and Ramana [22] show how to efﬁciently
compute, among all tax vectors that induce a minimum-latency ﬂow as a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium, the tax
vector minimizing the amount of tax paid by the trafﬁc. (Of course, even the best such tax vector might
require trafﬁc to pay exorbitant taxes.) A different objective is to minimize the total latency of trafﬁc,
subject to a ﬁxed budget on the amount of taxes that can be paid. Are there non-trivial algorithmic results
for this problem?
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Fig. 5. Proof of Theorem 4.5. If f is the ﬂow sending one unit of ﬂow on the four-hop path and f ∗ is the ﬂow sending half a unit
of ﬂow on each of the other two paths, then the dashed edges are light.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 4.5
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Let (G, r, ) be an instance in which G has n vertices, and let  be a tax on the
edges. Let f be a directed acyclic Nash ﬂow for (G, r, ) (see Proposition 2.4), and f ∗ a Nash ﬂow for
(G, r,  + ). Let d and d∗ be the corresponding distance labels of Proposition 2.2. In the notation of
Proposition 2.6, we need to prove that D ≡ d(t) = c(G, r, ) is at most n/2	 times D∗ ≡ d∗(t) =
c(G, r,  + ).
An ordering of the vertices of G is good if it satisﬁes the following two properties.
(P1) All f-ﬂow travels forward in the ordering.
(P2) The d-values of vertices are non-decreasing in the ordering.
There is at least one good ordering. To see why, ﬁrst topologically sort the vertices of G according to the
(directed acyclic) ﬂow f to ensure property (P1). An ordered pair (u, v) of vertices is bad if d(v) < d(u)
in spite of v following u in the ordering. Property (P2) is equivalent to the absence of bad vertex pairs.
If there is a bad vertex pair, there is one such pair (v,w) with v and w adjacent in the ordering. We would
like to transpose v and w. By Proposition 2.2 and the non-negativity of latency functions, d-values cannot
decrease across an edge e with fe > 0. Hence, there is no ﬂow-carrying edge from v to w. Transposing
v and w therefore does not violate property (P1) and strictly decreases the number of bad vertex pairs.
Finitely many such transpositions yields a good ordering.
Place a good ordering on the vertices of G and label them v0, v1, . . . , vn−1 accordingly. We can assume
that v0 = s. Call an edge e of G light if fef ∗e with f ∗e > 0, and heavy otherwise. We can ﬁnish the
proof by establishing two claims (see also Fig. 5).
(1) If vj precedes t in the good ordering, then there is a path of light edges beginning in {v0, v1, . . . , vj }
and terminating in {t, vj+2, vj+3, . . . , vn−1}.
(2) If there is a path of light edges from u to v, then d(v)d(u) + D∗.
Since d(s) = 0 and d-values are non-decreasing in the good ordering, applying these two claims induc-
tively to the sets {v0, . . . , v2i} gives d(v2i)i ·D∗ for v2i equal to or preceding t. If t = v2i for an integer
i, the theorem follows immediately. If t = v2i+1, then d(v2i)i · D∗ and the theorem follows from one
further application of the two claims (to {v0, . . . , v2i}).
To prove the ﬁrst claim, let vj precede t in the good ordering. By property (P1) of good orderings,
no f-ﬂow enters the s–t cut S = {v0, . . . , vj }. Since the net f-ﬂow and f ∗-ﬂow escaping any s–t cut is
precisely r (see e.g. [43, Lemma8.1]), at least one light edge escapes S. If some such edge has its head
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Fig. 6. Proof of Theorem 6.2. In a “no” instance of 2DDP, s1.t1 and s2.t2 paths must share a vertex.
in {t, vj+2, . . . , vn−1}, we are done. If not, all such light edges terminate at a vertex vj+1 that precedes t
in the ordering. By the above argument, some light edge e escapes {v0, . . . , vj+1}. Since all light edges
emanating from S end at vj+1, e begins at vj+1. Thus, its concatenation with any light edge escaping S
provides the desired path of light edges.
For the second claim, let P be a path of light edges from u to v. Since taxes are non-negative and latency
functions are non-decreasing, e(fe)e(f ∗e )+ e for every edge e in P. Since f ∗e > 0 for all edges e of
P, Proposition 2.2 implies that
d(v) − d(u)
∑
e∈P
e(fe)
∑
e∈P
[
e(f
∗
e ) + e
] = d∗(v) − d∗(u).
Similarly,
0d∗(u)d∗(v)D∗
and hence d(v) − d(u)d∗(v) − d∗(u)D∗. This completes the proof of the claim and hence the
theorem. 
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 6.2
Proof ofTheorem 6.2. As in [36, Theorem 3.3], our reduction will proceed from the problem 2 DIRECTED
DISJOINT PATHS (2DDP): given a directed graph G = (V ,E) and distinct vertices s1, s2, t1, t2 ∈ V , are
there si–ti paths Pi for i = 1, 2 such that P1 and P2 are vertex-disjoint? Fortune et al. [19] showed that
this problem is NP-complete. We will show how a (43 − )-approximation algorithm for minimizing the
cost of a Nash ﬂow with taxes in a network with linear latency functions can be used to distinguish “yes”
and “no” instances of 2DDP in polynomial time.
Let I = (G = (V ,E), s1, s2, t1, t2) be an instance of 2DDP. Augment the vertex set V by a source
s, a sink t, and directed edges (s, s1), (s, s2), (t1, t), and (t2, t) (see Fig. 6). Denote the new network by
G′ = (V ′, E′). We give the edges of E′ the following (linear) latency functions: all edges of E receive
the latency function (x) = 0, edges (s, s2) and (t1, t) are given the latency function (x) = x, and edges
(s, s1) and (t2, t) are endowed with the latency function (x) = 1.
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Following the notation of Section 5.1, we will write C() for the cost of a Nash ﬂow in (G′, 1,  + ).
To complete the proof, we need only show the following two statements:
(i) if I is a “yes” instance of 2DDP, then there is a set  of taxes with C() = 3/2;
(ii) if I is a “no” instance, then C()2 for all non-negative taxes .
To prove (i), let P1 and P2 be vertex-disjoint s1–t1 and s2–t2 paths in G, respectively. Assign zero taxes
to edges in E′ \E, P1, and P2. Set taxes e on all other edges e to be sufﬁciently large. Then, routing half
a unit of ﬂow on each of P1 and P2 yields a ﬂow at Nash equilibrium proving that C() = 3/2.
For (ii), consider taxes  and a Nash ﬂow f  for (G′, 1,  + ). Let d denote the distance labels of
Proposition 2.2. Since there is one unit of trafﬁc, (ii) is tantamount to showing that d(t)2.
First, if f  routes all ﬂow through a single si–tj pair, then the latency of all ﬂow paths is 2 and hence
d(t)2. We can thus assume that f  routes ﬂow through at least two distinct si–tj pairs. Similarly, we
can assume that no ﬂow path contains both s1 and t2.
Now suppose f  routes ﬂow on a path P1 containing s1 and t1 and also on a path P2 containing s2
and t2. Since I is a “no” instance of 2DDP, P1 and P2 share an internal vertex v (see Fig. 6). Since
P1 is a ﬂow path of the Nash ﬂow f  that contains v and the edge (s, s1), Proposition 2.2 implies that
d(v)1. Similarly, since P2 is a ﬂow path containing v and the edge (t2, t), Proposition 2.2 implies that
d(t)d(v) + 12.
The ﬁnal case arises when all ﬂow paths contain a single si or a single ti (but not both). If all ﬂow
paths contain a single si , then all ﬂow uses edge (s, si), so d(si)1. As in the previous paragraph, since
there is a ﬂow path of f  containing si and edge (t2, t), Proposition 2.2 implies that d(t)d(si) + 12.
A similar argument proves that d(t)2 if all ﬂow paths of f  contain a single ti . 
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